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Book Review

JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER:
CENSORING OURSELVES IN AN ANXIOUS AGE.
Robert F. Nagel.1 New York: Oxford University Press.
1994. Pp. x, 188. Cloth, $29.95.
Mark A. Graberz
Judicial Power and American Character is a thought-provoking book that often provokes the wrong thoughts. Robert F.
Nagel deftly portrays the pathologies of a legal cultureJ that can
neither endorse in theory nor deny in practice the political nature
of judicial review. That culture is indicted for failing to examine
the actual consequences of legal doctrines, engaging in any abusive practice necessary to retain control of the judiciary, holding
the American people in contempt, and ignoring valued, but inarticulate, political traditions. Nagel makes a strong case for each
count. Unfortunately, his examples implicitly lay the blame for
these contemporary judicial vices almost entirely at the door of
liberal jurists and scholars.4 As a result, rather than further common efforts to improve the quality of political and legal discourse, the rhetoric of Judicial Power may promote complacency
on the right and recriminations on the left. Moreover, by identifying, often correctly, the defects of only one side to a political
struggle, Nagel overlooks the ways in which questionable liberal
1. Ira Rothgerber, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado.
2. Associate Professor of Government, University of Maryland.
3. Although entitled Judicial Power and American Character, the main body of
Nagel's work concentrates on the foibles of contemporary legal culture and on how that
culture perceives American character. As discussed below, Nagel's brief discussion of
more general features of contemporary political culture is both superficial and flawed.
4. Only in the last chapter does Nagel clearly indicate that his targets are "progressive intolerance," "progressive censorship," and "reformers." Robert E. Nagel, Judicial
Power and American Character: Censoring Ourselves in an Anxious Age at 141-43 (Oxford U. Press, 1994) ("Judicial Power"). By comparison, his introduction specifically describes the failings of contemporary culture in "the first person plural," indicating that
these failings are features of the general society rather than of any particular group. Id. at
6.
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claims and behaviors are responses to questionable conservative
claims and political behaviors.
Nagel's discussion of how elite professorial attitudes warped
the Bork hearings demonstrates the power of his cultural eyesight and exposes substantial deficiencies in the contemporary judicial confirmation process. Rather than side with either Robert
Bork or his critics, Judicial Power documents the common
ground that unites academic originalists and non-originalists.
Some commonalities concern tone. "A very large number of law
professors," Nagel observes, "criticize uninhibitedly, and generally write with a degree of authority to which we are not entitled. "s As a result, the stakes in the Bork hearings were
artificially inflated because the academic participants who engaged in those rhetorical practices too often described their rivals
as radicals or extremists,6 rather than, as would be more accurate, fellow scholars with theories that seemed, on balance, somewhat inferior to their own. More significantly, Nagel justly
complains that contemporary academic writing, whether by Bork
or Laurence Tribe, exhibits "an attachment to theory that subordinates the wisdom of experience and the weight of practice."7
All parties to the Bork hearing would blithely disregard decades
of legal precedent to implement their pet theories of judicial review, theories that are rarely grounded in any empirical understanding of how judicial decisions actually influence political
practices.s Indeed, hardly any classic of contemporary constitution interpretation is informed by the substantial literature in
political science which discusses the capacity of courts as social
policymakers.9
This commitment to arcane legal reasoning has descended
from the legal professorate to Congress. During the Bork hearings, Nagel points out, representatives aped (and were praised
5. Id. at 32.
6. Id. at 31-39.
7. Id. at 39.
8. Id. at 33.
9. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (U. of Chi. Press, 1991); Charles A. Johnson and Bradley C. Canon, Judicial
Policies: Implementation and Impact (CQ Press, 1984); Donald L Horowitz, The Courts
and Social Policy (Brookings Institute, 1977). Significantly, while Rosenberg reports that
the "old dead horse of judicial efficacy rears up with a vengeance" whenever he discusses
The Hollow Hope in legal forums, Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley and McCann, 18 Law and Soc. Inquiry 761, 776 (1993), some
political scientists complain that "Rosenberg's skeptical position [on judicial power] very
much flows with, rather than against, prevailing scholarly currents." Michael W. McCann,
Reform Litigation on Trial, 18 Law and Soc. Inquiry 715, 730 (1993). See Malcolm M.
Feeley, Hollow Hopes, flypaper and Metaphors, 18 Law and Soc. Inquiry 745, 751 (1993).

1995]

BOOK REVIEW

307

for aping) the legal academy. Rather than use the confirmation
process as an opportunity to review "the actual effects of the
Supreme Court's doctrines and decisions," senators asked
"learned questions on textualism, judicial restraint, the place of
stare decisis in constitutional law, and other matters of legal philosophy. "to This learned practice seems astonishing given that
most voters are probably more concerned with the state of their
schools or crime in their neighborhoods than with the latest fad
in semiotics.n
Nagel explains this strange proclivity of senators to behave
like academics rather than persons charged with making public
policy when confirming judicial nominees by noting our political
culture's tendency to avoid moral discourse. "[M]any Americans," he declares, "would have found it unnerving to have their
representatives openly and directly confront issues of value and
consequence."12 The rise of such movements as the Christian
Coalition and feminism, however, suggest that many citizens do
want elected officials to make fundamental ethical choices. The
problem representatives face is that, in the absence of any clear
consensus on what values the people prefer, making any decision
on abortion, race or related issues may be a political loser.
Hence, elected officials have special reasons not to "confront issues of value and consequence." By keeping their questions at a
high level of abstraction, the people's representatives imitate
statespersons while foisting off to the judiciary the responsibility
for various political hot potatoes.13
Nagel brings his discussion of the confirmation process to a
close by condemning contemporary struggles to control the federal judiciary for losing all sense of propriety. "During the
Thomas hearings," he notes, "procedural fairness seemed ... [an]
almost ridiculous presence patently subordinate to large political
forces and objectives."t4 Such concerns with the confirmation
process are widespread. Stephen Carter has similarly observed
that "nobody is interested in playing by a fair set of rules that
supersedes the cause of the moment."ts Nagel, however,
10. Judicial Power at 40-41 (cited in note 4).
11. See Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning up the Federal Appointments Process 57 (Basic Books, 1994).
12. Judicial Power at 43 (cited in note 4).
13. This argument is laid out at length in Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Studies in American Political Development 35 (1993).
14. Judicial Power at 27 (cited in note 4).
15. Carter, The Confirmation Mess at ix (cited in note 11). See generally, Symposium, Confirmation Controversy: The Selection of a Supreme Court Justice, 84 Nw. U. L.
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presents a more partisan analysis than Carter. Carter notes "how
much right and left have come to resemble each other in the
gleeful and reckless distortions that characterize the efforts to defeat challenged nominations."16 Nagel's discussion of the
Thomas hearings, by comparison, focuses almost exclusively on
the sins of the opposition.
Judicial Power correctly labels as a "smear" Senator Howard
Metzenbaum's unsupported allegation that John Doggett, a witness for Thomas, was guilty of sexual harassment.17 The book,
however, fails to acknowledge or even mention the hatchet job
Senator Arlen Specter did on Anita Hill, Senator Alan Simpson's
McCarthy-like insinuations of secret evidence discrediting Hill
or, for that matter, President Bush's dubious claim that Clarence
Thomas was the best qualified American to fill Thurgood Marshall's seat on the Supreme Court.ls Nagel criticizes Anita Hill
and her confidants for refusing to reveal her claims of harassment,19 but says nothing about how White House aides almost
certainly suborned perjury when they advised Thomas to tell the
Senate that he had never thought about whether abortion is a
constitutional right.2o
This one-sided analysis weakens Nagel's critique of the
Thomas hearings. Supporters of liberal judicial activism when
confronted with "what about Metzenbaum" are more likely to
respond "what about Simpson" than acknowledge their responsibility for the present confirmation mess. Only when both sides
confess error will progress likely be made toning down debates
over Supreme Court nominees. A more balanced approach
might also better address the causes of improper practices. Much
abuse during contemporary confirmation processes may stem
from real grievances with the other side's performance. Anita
Hill can be treated unfairly because Clarence Thomas is perceived as being unfairly treated. John Doggett can be treated
unfairly because Anita Hill is perceived as being unfairly treated.
More generally, "the sudden stridency in Senate opposition to a
Rev. 832 (1990); Essays on the Supreme Court Appointments Process, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1146 (1988).
16. Carter, The Confirmation Mess at ix (cited in note 11).
17. Judicial Power at 25 (cited in note 4).
18. For a good survey of these and related grievances by supporters of Anita Hill,
see Toni Morrison, ed., Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power: Essays on Anita Hil~ Clarence Thomas, and the Construction of Social Reality (Pantheon Books, 1992). See also
Roger J. Miner, Advice and Consent in Theory and Practice, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 1075, 1080
(1992).
19. Judicial Power at 20-21 (cited in note 4).
20. See Miner, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. at 1083-84 (cited in note 18).
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variety of judicial appointments," Carter observes, "is sometimes
defended as a response to what has been described, fairly or not,
as an unprecedented effort to pack the court with ideological
soulmates."2t Nagel's obsession with the transgressions of one
side in this environment seems more a call for unilateral disarmament than the first steps towards a negotiated settlement.
Nagel's analysis of the intellectual snobbery underlying liberal judicial activism exhibits the same combination of acute insight and partisan distortion as his treatment of the confirmation
process. Judicial Power bluntly declares that contemporary legal
decisions are championed by "elites [who] see the recalcitrance
of others as a sign of personal deficiencies" and "do not believe
that their fellows can even face up to problems honestly, let
alone exercise the civic-spirited discipline necessary to solve
them."22 Nagel's class-based characterization of American judicial culture extends a distinguished tradition in American political thought. More than eighty years ago, Edward Corwin
declared that "fear of popular majorities ... lies at the very basis
of the whole system of judicial review";23 Jennifer Nedelsky has
similarly noted how the Federalist concept of judicial review rests
on "a general suspicion of the people."24 Remarkably, proponents of liberal activism often acknowledge this "fear of popular
majorities." Prominent defenders of Roe v. Wade, for example,
have write under the heading "The Political Process: Not to be
Trusted. "2s
Still, few contemporary champions of liberal judicial activism state their low regard for the constitutional fidelity of the
average citizen as bluntly as Nagel does, and Nagel's tone is warranted. To reshape schools, election districts, prisons and other
institutions as courts are doing requires real confidence that one
is attacking constitutional evils. One's foes, in this world view,
cannot simply have an alternative vision of the constitutional order. Rather, liberal justices and their supporters must believe
21. Carter, The Confirnuuion Mess at 72 (cited in note 11). For a superb general
treatment of the political forces underlying recent confinnation battles, see Mark Silver·
stein, Judicious Choices: The New Politics of Supreme Coun Confirmations (W.W. Norton
& Co., 1994).
22. Judicial Power at 142 (cited in note 4).
23. Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Coun and the Founeenth Amendment, 9 Mich.
L. Rev. 643, 670 {1909).
24. Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Propeny and the Limits of American Constitutionalism 6 (U. of Chi. Press, 1990).
25. Susan R. Estrich and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Polilics: Writing for an
Audience of One, 138 U. Penn. L. Rev. 119, 150 (1989). See also, Carter, The Confirmation Mess at 117 (cited in note 11) (describing "the Court as an important bulwark against
majority tyranny").
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that democratic majorities have no commitment to constitutional
values and will subvert them if given the opportunity. Much contemporary constitutional law, Nagel neatly demonstrates, can be
explained only by a tacit assumption that "the public and its officials do not sufficiently appreciate the constitutional values enunciated by the Supreme Court and are-if left to their own
devises-likely to take unacceptable risks with those values."z6
The justices, for example, formerly declared informed consent
laws unconstitutional not because informed consent was a constitutional evil, but because the justices feared such measures would
be used "to 'intimidate women' and 'to deter' abortions."z7
Having perceptively identified "fear of popular majorities"
as the central question of contemporary judicial politics and rhetoric, however, Nagel assumes a particular answer. In the political
universe of Judicial Power, opponents of liberal judicial activism
can do no wrong; they wish only "to serve the public good. "28
Racism ceased to be a political factor in American public life
somewhere around 196(}29 and no reason exists for thinking that
obscenity laws might result in "widespread timidity and arbitrary
practices, where valuable ideas and information about sexuality
never see the light of day."JO Proponents of restrictions against
homosexuality are not bigots, in Nagel's opinion. Such persons
are "profoundly uncertain about egalitarian experimentation on
policies having consequences for such a sensitive and mysterious
matter as sexual identity."31 Nowhere does Nagel explain how
such advocates differ from Klansman who are presumably "profoundly uncertain about egalitarian experimentation on policies
having consequences for such a sensitive and mysterious matter
as [racial/religious] identity."
Indeed, opponents of liberal judicial policies need not articulate reasons when defending their preferred norms. The liberal
demand that any state coercive policy be justified,32 in Nagel's
mind, is merely another manifestation "of a prejudice or impulse
26.

Judicial Power at 76 (cited in note 4).

27. Id. at 74 (discussing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 416 U.S.
747 (1986)).
28. ld. at 155.
29.

Id. at 115-19 (discussing Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391

u.s. 430 (1968)).

30. Id. at 125.
31. Id.
32. See cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 17 (Harv. U. Press, 1993) ("In
American constitutional law, government must always have a reason for what it does. If
it is distributing something to one group rather than to another, or depriving someone of
some good or benefit, it must explain itself"); Ronald Dworkin, lAw's Empire 93-95
(Harv. U. Press, 1986).
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widely seen among the intellectual elite-an unexamined bias
against the inarticulate."33 This disregard for what Nagel labels
"mute behaviors"34 privileges elite values because less educated
citizens lack the intellectual sophistication necessary to defend
their inherited traditions. Nagel recognizes that "mute behavior[s]" can "be either attractive or repellent; they can represent
deep wisdom or intractable prejudice."Js Unfortunately, Judicial
Power offers no guidelines for distinguishing between "attractive" or "repellent" "mute behaviors."
The case against progressive uses of the judicial power substantially weakens when one examines more closely than Nagel
the concerns of those popular majorities that liberal jurists fear.
Consider Nagel's claim that the court acted as a censor when
striking down informed consent statutes. Pro-choice advocates,
he claims (without quoting or citing them), fear that "many pregnant females-by instinct or acculturation-were, no doubt,
highly receptive to reasons for giving birth." This use of the judicial power, therefore, enables proponents of Roe v. Wade36 to
"protect" "pregnant patients ... from their own minds and inclinations." Like traditional censors, Nagel maintains, pro-choice
forces regard "information [as] dangerous because it is potentially persuasive and ... people should be relieved of the burden
of deciding whether to be persuaded."37
A closer look at both informed consent provisions and the
pro-choice attack on them belies Nagel's naive assertion that
"the provision of accurate information could have been seen as
helping to assure knowing, voluntary decisions. "38 Opponents of
informed consent do not object only to State efforts that discourage abortions. They object to state efforts that conscript doctors
in that state effort to discourage abortions. As the Supreme
Court noted in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians,
"forcing the physician or counselor to present the materials and
the list to the women makes him or her in effect an agent of the
State in treating the woman and places his or her imprimatur
upon both the materials and the list."39 More significantly, both
pro-choice justices and advocates regard informed consent laws
as " 'a parade of horribles' of dubious validity," and many spe33. Judicial Power at 146 (cited in note 4).
34. ld. at 151.
35. ld. at 152.
36. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
37. Judicial Power at 114, 115 (cited in note 4).
38. ld. at 113.
39. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. at 763.

312

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 12:305

cific requirements as "the antithesis of informed consent."40
Pennsylvania, for example, required physicians to inform women
seeking abortions that "detrimental physical and psychological
effects might occur and were not accurately foreseeable," even
though medical authorities generally agree that the overwhelming majority of women who have abortions suffer no significant
physical or psychological complications.4t Similarly, the Keystone State required patients to be informed that "the father was
required to assist with child support." Yet, as welfare authority
Deborah Stone notes,
fathers are generally ordered to pay only a small proportion of
their income in child support, and the portion declines as the
man's income rises. Around half of fathers who are ordered
to make child support payments do not make them after the
first year or so, and courts do nothing about enforcing the
awards.42

As the Court politely noted in Thornburgh, "theoretical financial
responsibility often does not equate with fulfillment. "43
In short, from the perspective of pro-choice justices and advocates, proponents of so-called "informed consent" are interfering with "knowing, voluntary decisions" by "conveying . . .
misleading and factually inaccurate impression[s]."44 Pro-life advocates do have anecdotes of women being pressured into abortions through presentation of misleading information.4s Still,
rather than accept one side's interpretation of itself, as Nagel
does, a realist investigation of informed consent laws would examine how accurate each party's claims are and how perceptions
of abuse by one side lead to actions that the other side regards as
abusive. Who the censor is depends on how informed "informed
consent" laws are.
40. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 7fJl, 764 (quoting Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc. v. City of Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983)).
41. See Donald N. Bersoff, Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Appellees, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S.
747 n.9 (1986).
42. Deborah A. Stone, Sex, Lies and the Scarlet Letter, 22 The American Prospect
105, 108 (Spring 1995).
43. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763.
44. Bersoff, Brief of Amicus Curiae at n.12 (cited in note 41).
45. See David C. Reardon, Aborted Women: Silent No More 30-31 (Crossway
Books, 1987). No study, however, has found that coerced abortion is a major social problem. Very few women regret their abortions upon reflection, and most women who have
abortions become more sympathetic to pro-choice positions. See E. Freeman, Influence
of Personality Attributes on Abortion Experiences, 47 Am. Jour. of Orthopsychiatry ?03,
506 (1977); Donald Granberg, The Abortion Activists, 13 Family Planning Perspectives
157, 161 (1981).
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Nagel concludes Judicial Power with a call for democratic
"renewal."46 To revitalize our republic, he proclaims, "society at
large" must overcome "doubts about itself and its past" that lead
the citizenry to "participate[ ] willingly in its own Uudicial] censorship."47 Repressing these doubts, unfortunately, apparently
requires that we either deny the existence of past repressive practices that scholars have documented played a vital role in American constitutional development4s or insist that no vestiges of
those practices exist at present.49 Acknowledging past injustices,
on the other hand, might force Americans to recognize that our
society is capable of systemically violating fundamental human
and constitutional rights, and that such abuses may still occur at
present. Moreover, the moral certainty Nagel would foster may
not be conducive to a healthy republic. Anthony Comstock, in
his view, seems the ideal democratic citizen, along with John
Brown, Joe McCarthy and Pat Buchanan, none of whom ever
expressed doubt about their essential political commitments. A
more realistic view of democracy suggests that popular government functions best when most citizens treat their fellows with
equal concern and respect and do not take opposing and unyielding positions on matters of public importance.so If abortion and
affirmative action are examples of the present state of political
debate, the polity might benefit from less certainty and more
doubt.

46. Judicial Power at 156 (cited in note 4).
47. Id. at 154.
48. See Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 549 (1993).
49. See notes 28-31 and the relevant text.
50. See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America 85-86 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 15-84 (U. of Chi. Press,
1956).

